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Research in sports, dance and rehabilitation has shown that basic action concepts (BACs)
are fundamental building blocks of mental action representations. BACs are based on
chunked body postures related to common functions for realizing action goals. In this
paper, we outline issues in research methodology and an experimental method, the
structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M), to assess action-relevant
representational structures that reflect the organization of BACs. The SDA-M reveals a
strong relationship between cognitive representation and performance if complex actions
are performed. We show how the SDA-M can improve motor imagery training and
how it contributes to our understanding of coaching processes. The SDA-M capitalizes
on the objective measurement of individual mental movement representations before
training and the integration of these results into the motor imagery training. Such motor
imagery training based on mental representations (MTMR) has been applied successfully
in professional sports such as golf, volleyball, gymnastics, windsurfing, and recently in the
rehabilitation of patients who have suffered a stroke.
Keywords: mental representation, mental imagery, motor imagery, mental simulation, basic action concepts
The representation and simulation of motor acts has a long
and varied history in psychology and movement science. Johann
Friedrich Herbart related movements to perceptual effects as early
as 1825 and proposed that the imagery of perceptual effects
can elicit the related movements (p. 464). William James (1890,
p. 526) wrote some decades later “that every representation of
a movement awakens in some degree the actual movement. . .”.
These and other approaches of an ideomotor understanding of
human action felt out of fashion in the era of behaviorism
(see Shin et al., 2010 for a review). However, around 100 years
later they became an important reference point for many exper-
imental approaches, for example, ideomotor action (e.g., Knuf
et al., 2001; Kunde, 2001; Koch et al., 2004; Kunde et al., 2004),
common coding (Prinz, 1987, 1997), anticipative behavioral control
(Hoffmann, 1993; Hoffmann et al., 2004), theory of event coding
(Hommel et al., 2001) and cognitive architecture of action approach
(Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Schack and Ritter, 2009). These
approaches underline the goal-directedness of human behavior
(termed “motor cognition” by Jeannerod, 2006, p. v) and are
considered an alternative to non-cognitive approaches to human
movement.
These new perceptual-cognitive perspectives emphasize the
goal-directedness property of actions, the importance of antici-
pated perceptual effects, the crucial role of mental representations
in action control and the functional role of mental simulation for
planning and performing voluntary movements with the help of
structured cognitive representations of action effects (Hommel
et al., 2001; Mechsner et al., 2001; Schack and Mechsner, 2006;
Hoffmann et al., 2007). Furthermore, skillful coordination occurs
if appropriate mental representations of the motor task and action
goals are constructed, because cognitive representations govern
the tuning of motor commands and muscular activity patterns.
In fact, this perceptual-cognitive approach to movement control
is reminiscent of some classical ideas in psychology, such as the
“ideomotor” approach adopted by Lotze (1852) and James (1890)
in the 19th century and the theoretical studies of movement
construction by Bernstein (Bernštejn) (1947, English transla-
tion 1967) in the 20th century. Although this perspective never
disappeared, it was obscured by the dominant and competitive
perspectives of cognitive and dynamical systems approaches to
motor control.
Whereas dynamical systems in principle try to explain biolog-
ical movements without alluding to cognitive levels (or internal
models), Bernstein (Bernštejn) (1947) envisaged a complex archi-
tecture of human movement control ranging from “low” levels
corresponding to involuntary movements, up to “high” cognitive
levels that can be thought of as concepts. The second “lowest”
level corresponds to synergistic processing, and this level has often
been referred to in dynamical systems approaches (e.g., Wolpert
et al., 1995; Ijspeert et al., 2002). We note that spinal (e.g., D’Avella
and Bizzi, 1998; Poppele and Bosco, 2003) and some muscle
synergies do not always require input from higher cognitive levels
(e.g., Debicki and Gribble, 2005). Such aspects of involuntary
movements are often addressed in sensorimotor models of motor
control (e.g., Kawato, 1999; Todorov, 2004). These processes run
mostly automatically but can reach conscious levels if attention
is directed towards them. In stark contrast to “low” levels, our
understanding of cognitive movement control is far less known.
Therefore, in this paper, we have focused on “higher” (i.e.,
cognitive) levels of human motor control (perceptual-cognitive
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approach), and suggest that cognitive representations should be
differentiated from cognitive control of movements (cf. Schack,
2004a,b, 2010). That is, our approach is more closely related
to cognitive approaches for motor control such as Schmidt’s
classical schema theory1 (Schmidt, 1975) and is in competition
with dynamical system approaches. However, we do not suggest
that motor control, or even voluntary movements, are solely
controlled from a cognitive level. Involuntary motor control (e.g.,
reflexes and postural control) are also critically important as
sensorimotor loops. We will discuss how cognitive levels of move-
ment representation and control can be measured and used for
(training) interventions. Among the key issues are how structured
mental representations can arise during motor skill acquisition
and how these representations attain a functional role in motor
learning. Related questions concern the role of cognitive repre-
sentations in motor imagery training and, prospectively, whether
motor imagery can be applied to technical platforms and robotics.
MENTAL REPRESENTATION
It is a well established idea in cognitive psychology and indeed
it has received growing acceptance in the fields of motor control
and sport psychology that actions are mentally represented in
functional terms as a combination of the executed action and the
intended or observed effects (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001;
Knuf et al., 2001; Koch et al., 2004; Jeannerod, 2006, p. 165). The
link between movements and perceptual effects is bi-directional
and is thought to be stored hierarchically in long-term memory
(LTM). Such movement representations are necessary because
complex movements are highly unlikely to rely solely on online
calculation due to human resource limitations. Rosenbaum and
co-workers (Rosenbaum et al., 2007) demonstrated that move-
ments can be understood as a serial and functional order of goal-
related body postures, or goal postures, and their transitional
states. That is, movements can be understood as the changes
between body postures. Whereas body postures (keyframes)
are represented in detail, the interframes (i.e., the movements
between body postures) contain only differences between two
successive keyframes. The better the order formation within cog-
nitive movement representations, the more easily information can
be accessed and retrieved (Schack and Ritter, 2009). This leads
to increased motor execution performance, which reduces the
amount of attention required for successful performance (Beilock
1According to the Schmidt’s Schema Theory, each skill action we have learned
needs its own individual motor program stored in LTM. Schmidt suggested
that we need 3 things to perform a skill: A generalized motor program as the
basic form of our movements, like a forehand drop shot that can generate a
variety of similar actions under different circumstances, e.g., shots at a variety
of heights. A Recall Schema to adjust the generalized motor program for a
particular action (e.g., a forehand drop at a particular height) after under-
standing the actual situation (initial conditions) and the intentions (response
specification). When the movement is performed, the sensory consequences
(e.g., feel of the movement) and response outcomes (e.g., flight path of the
shuttlecock) are stored in memory. This is the so called Recognition Schema
used to evaluate the outcome of the movement (response outcome) and to
detect errors. If the response outcome is not perfect, the schemas are modified
based on sensory feedback and knowledge of results. This leads to further
adjustments of the generalized motor program when practicing a movement
in order to subsequently achieve the desired outcome.
et al., 2002; Raab and Johnson, 2007; Land et al., 2014). The
nodes within such networks of movement representation contain
functional subunits or building blocks that relate motor actions
and associated perceptual effects.
Researchers from different fields, such as cognitive psychology,
cognitive robotics and sport psychology (Schack, 2004a,b; Schack
and Mechsner, 2006; Schack and Ritter, 2009, 2013; Tenenbaum
et al., 2009; Maycock et al., 2010), have provided evidence for
so-called basic action concepts (BACs) in the control of human
movements. Analogous to the well-established notion of basic
object concepts (Rosch, 1978), BACs are the mental counterparts
of functional elementary components of complex movements.
They can be thought of as the cognitive chunking of body postures
and movement events concerning common functions in realizing
action goals. BACs do not refer to behavior-related invariant
properties of objects, as in the case in basic object concepts, but to
perception-linked invariant properties of movements. According
to the cognitive action architecture approach (Schack, 2010),
mental representations are thought to comprise of such repre-
sentational units (i.e., BACs) and their structural composition in
relation to one another.
To investigate representational networks of BACs, the struc-
tural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M)
method was developed by Schack (2004a). Various methods
facilitate the study of knowledge-based mental representations of
movements in LTM (for an overview, see Hodges et al., 2007).
However, most of them focus on explicit knowledge and are non-
experimental (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, paper-and-pencil
tests). As an experimental method that avoids introspective state-
ments, Schack (2004a, 2010) introduced the SDA-M method. This
method provides psychometric data on mental representations of
complex movements and as such permits investigating the status
and change of structures of mental movement representations.
In detail, the SDA-M (Schack, 2010) maps mental represen-
tations as integrated networks of BACs across both individuals
and groups, by providing information on relational structures
in a given set of concepts with respect to goal-oriented actions.
The internal grouping of conceptual units (i.e., the clustering of
BACs) delineates the structure of the knowledge representation of
a certain movement. While mental representation structure refers
to the relation and the grouping of BACs in LTM, learning can
be considered as the modification of the mental representation
structure over time. That is, mental representation of complex
movements can be measured by the SDA-M method.
The SDA-M consists of four steps (for further details, see
Schack, 2012). First, a split procedure involving a multiple sorting
task (pair-wise comparisons) delivers a distance scaling between
BACs of a suitably predetermined set. Specifically, during this
procedure, one concept of a given set of BACs is permanently
displayed on a computer screen (anchor concept) and all other
concepts are compared to that anchor concept successively. Par-
ticipants have to decide whether the two given concepts are related
to each other during movement execution. The procedure contin-
ues, until all concepts have been compared to all other concepts.
Second, a hierarchical cluster analysis is used to transform the
set of BACs into a hierarchical structure. Third, a factor analysis
reveals the dimensions in this structured set of BACs, and fourth,
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the cluster solutions are tested for invariance within or between
groups.
As a result, one obtains the individual partitioning of the BACs
in hierarchical tree-like structures, the so-called dendrograms
(see Figure 1). Cluster solutions are calculated for all individ-
ual participants and for the whole group. Each cluster solution
is established by determining a critical Euclidean distance dcrit
(marked by the dotted horizontal line in Figure 1). The critical
value dcrit depends on the number of concepts. All junctures
below the value dcrit are considered related, while the junctures
above this value are considered unrelated. This results in a cluster
solution. In an optimal structure, the resulting cluster solution
represents the functional phases of the movement.
A good example to investigate the mental representation struc-
tures of a complex movement on different levels of expertise is
the tennis serve (Schack and Mechsner, 2006). For a tennis serve,
not only many degrees of freedom have to be controlled in the
musculoskeletal system, but also the correct movement execution
depends considerably on training and expertise. On the other
hand, it is a finite and recognizable action pattern of which the
overall structure is well defined by biomechanical demands.
The expert group in that study consisted of 11 male tennis
players (mean age, 24± 3.7 years) from the upper German leagues
who were ranked between places 15 and 500 in the German men’s
rankings. The non-player group were 11 males (mean age, 24 ±
6.7 years) with virtually no experience of the game (maximum
5 h) and had never had any tennis lessons.
The single BACs and the adequate functional organization of
the tennis serve were characterized in advance in collaboration
with non-players, athletes with different levels of expertise, and
coaches. Photographs of the tennis sub-movements were pre-
sented to experts and non-players together with linguistic markers
of varying generality. The picture-word combination which took
the shortest time to judge its appropriateness was chosen, in
analogy to classical methods (Rosch, 1978).
Each BAC was characterized by a set of closely interconnected
sensory and functional features. For example, BAC 7 (whole body
stretch motion) is functionally related to providing energy to
the ball, transforming tension into swing, stretching but remain-
ing stable. Afferent sensory features of the corresponding sub-
movement that allow monitoring of the initial conditions are bent
knees, tilted shoulder axis, and body weight on the left foot. Re-
afferent sensory features that allow monitoring of whether the
functional demands of the sub-movements have been addressed
successfully are muscles stretched and under tension, propriocep-
tive and, finally, perhaps visual perception of the swinging arm
and ball in view.
Figure 1A depicts the dendrogram for the experts. Their
cognitive structure was very similar to an optimal cluster solution
and matches the functional and biomechanical demands of the
tennis serve. The three functional phases (i.e., pre-activation,
strike, and final swing) form clearly separated clusters in the
dendrogram. An invariance analysis (step four of the SDA-M)
confirmed this interpretation. There was no significant differ-
ence between the cognitive BAC framework in experts and the
biomechanical demand structure of the movement. In contrast,
the clustering of the BACs in the dendrogram of the non-players
(Figure 1B) did not mirror the functionally and biomechanically
demanded phases so well. The BACs were less clearly grouped,
with no close neighborhoods, and the partial clusters largely failed
to attain significance. The average novice structure, however,
deferred significantly from the optimal cluster solution (cf. Schack
and Mechsner, 2006). That is, in experts, these representational
frameworks were organized in a distinctive hierarchical tree-like
structure, were remarkably similar between individuals, and were
well-matched with the functional and biomechanical demands of
FIGURE 1 | Dendrograms for the experts (A) and non-players (B) based
on the hierarchical cluster analysis of BACs in the tennis serve. The
horizontally aligned numbers denote the BACs (for the code, see text), the
vertical numbers, the euclidean distances. For every group, it holds n = 11;
p = 0.05; dcrit = 3.46. A tennis serve consists of three distinct phases, each
of which fulfills distinct functional and biomechanical demands. First, in the
pre-activation phase, body and ball are brought into position, and tension
energy is provided to prepare the strike. The following BACs were identified:
(1) ball throw, (2) forward movement of the pelvis, (3) bending the knees, and
(4) bending the elbow. Second, in the strike phase, energy is conveyed to the
ball. The following BACs were identified: (5) frontal upper body rotation, (6)
racket acceleration, (7) whole body stretch motion, and (8) hitting point. Third,
in the final swing phase, the body is prevented from falling, and the racket
movement is decelerated after the strike. The following BACs were
identified: (9) wrist flap, (10) forward bending of the body, and (11) racket
follow through.
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the task. In contrast, action representations in low-level players
and novices were organized less hierarchically, were more variable
among persons, and were less well-matched with functional and
biomechanical demands.
More generally, if two BACs are frequently classified by partic-
ipants as being “functionally related” during the split procedure,
these BACs are characterized by a small Euclidean distance which
is reflected in a low projection of the BACs on the vertical axis in
the dendrogram (e.g., BACs 1 and 2 in Figure 1A). If two BACs
are not judged to be “functionally related”, the Euclidean distance
is larger and the projection of the two BACs is high in the tree
diagram (e.g., BACs 9 and 10 in Figure 1A).
In order to measure the inter-individual or inter-group differ-
ences between representation structures, a structural invariance
measure λ is determined based on (1) the number of constructed
clusters of the pair-wise cluster solutions; (2) the number of
concepts within the constructed clusters; and (3) the average
quantities of the constructed clusters. The invariance measure
λ ranges from 0 (no similarity at all) to 1 (tree diagrams are
identical). Two cluster solutions (or representation structures) are
considered to be invariant (i.e., the same) ifλ>λcrit = 0.68 (which
corresponds to a significance level of α = 0.05; for more detailed
information, see Schack, 2010, 2012).
Furthermore, as shown in a volleyball study (Schack, 2004b),
these mental representation structures are position- and task-
dependent. Such representation structures are the outcome of
an increasing, effort-reducing formation of order in LTM. With
increasing expertise, the representation of the movement cor-
responds more and more to its topological (spatiotemporal)
structure. Accordingly, movement control becomes possible by
representing the anticipated perceptual effects of the movement
and comparing them with incoming perceptual effects.
Accordingly, the structure of cognitive representations in LTM
is also relevant for perception and visuomotor control in motor
action. But little is known about the relationship of cognitive
representations and visuomotor control for complex movements.
Therefore, in a recent study we investigated whether cognitive
representations of complex movements influence (unconscious)
visual perception (Güldenpenning et al., 2011). Novices and
skilled high-jump athletes were shown to differ in that only skilled
athletes have a functionally structured, cognitive representation
of the high jump movement (Fosbury flop). Both groups were
asked to classify pictures of body postures of the high jump
movement. In a so-called priming paradigm, each of these picture
presentations were preceded by another picture of a high jump
body posture that could not be perceived consciously. Participants
had to classify whether the second pictures in each trial showed
a body posture from the approach or from the flight phase.
Importantly, the two pictures in each trial could differ with regard
to the shown movement phase but also in temporal order. That is,
both pictures could reflect the natural order within or between
movement phases or, alternatively, they could be presented in a
reversed order (e.g., flight before approach). We found a main
effect of temporal order for skilled athletes, that is, faster reaction
times for picture pairs that reflected the natural movement order
as opposed to the reversed movement order. Novices showed
a qualitatively different data pattern which was in line with
superficial processing of visual features unrelated to the high jump
movement. These results suggest that the structure of cognitive
movement representations modulates the visual processing of
body postures. Temporal information seems to be an important
dimension of such representations (cf. also Güldenpenning et al.,
2013) and can be processed automatically as the extraction of
temporal order information required unconscious processing of
(one of) the pictures.
Based on these and many other studies (e.g., Haggard and
Wolpert, 2005; Giummarra et al., 2007; Bläsing et al., 2010b),
we argue that major interfaces in the architecture of movement
are cognitive in nature (without fully denying the relevance of
automated processes such as reflexes or postural control of the
whole body). Such a perspective does not view the motor sys-
tem as being distinct from cognition. Instead, it considers both
conscious and automatized processes of movement organization
to be based functionally on cognitive representation structures.
This does not ignore the significance of emotional or motivational
processes; it simply puts them aside in order to focus on the
cognitive architecture of movement (Schack and Ritter, 2009).
In the next sections we will consider how mental representations
change during motor imagery and motor learning.
MENTAL REPRESENTATION AND LEARNING
Differences in the mental representation structure between
novices, intermediates, and experts (Schack and Mechsner, 2006;
Bläsing et al., 2009) suggest that the structure of mental repre-
sentations of complex movements changes with improvements in
the skill-level. More specifically, the structure of the mental rep-
resentation of a given complex movement might develop towards
the functional structure of an expert over the course of practice.
Therefore, a novice’s unstructured representation of a movement
is thought to develop into a more structured representation
during motor learning. Accordingly, we assume learning to be a
product of modifying the mediating structure among the BACs
(see Schack, 2004a).
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few studies
examining how mental representation structures develop dur-
ing practice. As it seems crucial to learn more about whether
and when changes in mental representations occur and how
they develop during learning, we examined structural changes
in mental representations of a complex movement during early
skill acquisition (Frank et al., 2013). The acquisition of the
golf putting movement was investigated in a group of novice
golfers. After a 3 day period of practice with the task, the mental
representation of the practice group was compared to that of a
control group. As expected, the mental representation structure
showed functional changes (i.e., functional clusters in the group’s
dendrogram) in the practice group along with performance
improvement while no such changes were observed in the control
group.
Specifically, the mental representation structure of the prac-
tice group changed over the course of practice from pre-test
(Figure 2A) to retention-test (Figure 2B) and became more
similar to an expert structure. As shown in Figure 2, the practice
group’s mean dendrogram revealed an increased number of func-
tional clusters during retention-test, with BACs being clustered
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FIGURE 2 | Mean group dendrograms of the practice group (n = 12) for
the golf putt at (A) pre-test and (B) retention-test. The numbers on the
x-axis relate to the BAC number, the numbers on the y -axis display euclidean
distances. The lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the
euclidean distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given α-level
(dcrit = 3.41; α = 0.05); links between BACs above this line are considered
unrelated; horizontal gray lines below BAC numbers mark clusters. BACs: (1)
shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip
check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep
arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders towards the
ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to
target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the
ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, and (16)
look to the outcome [Reprinted from Frank et al., 2013, with permission].
into three functional units relating to distinct movement phases
(i.e., movement preparation, the forward swing, and the impact
phase). In contrast, no changes were evident in the mental repre-
sentation structure of the control group which did not execute the
putt at all. These findings suggest that order formation of action-
related knowledge plays a significant role during motor learning,
presumably, for the development of movement expertise. Further
investigations from a number of different activities (e.g., golf,
soccer, wind surfing, volleyball, gymnastics, and dancing) also
support the functional relation between mental representation
structures and performance and expertise (Schack, 2004a; Schack
and Bar-Eli, 2007; Schack and Hackfort, 2007; Bläsing et al., 2009,
2010a; Velentzas et al., 2011).
NEW DIRECTIONS: APPLICATION OF SDA-M IN MOTOR
IMAGERY TRAINING
Studies in the first half of the 20th century indicate that perform-
ing mental tasks leads to subsequent performance improvements
(Sackett, 1935; see also Driskell et al., 1994). Generally, imagery
refers to a collection of abilities, including, for example, visual
imagery, kinesthetic imagery, imagery of movements or com-
binations of imagery modalities (e.g., Callow and Hardy, 2005;
Holmes, 2007; Roberts et al., 2008) and there continues to be no
consensus on the definitions of imagery. In sports, the subject of
imagery is traditionally related to movement (i.e., motor imagery,
cf. Jeannerod, 1994) and the main aim of motor imagery is
to enhance specific motor actions (cf. Boschker, 2001). Studies
have shown that specific training can increase the amount and
the efficiency of kinaesthetic imagery and enhance the imagery
of kinaesthetic sensations, making images more complex and
vivid (Nordin and Cumming, 2007; Golomer et al., 2008). Motor
imagery is a cognitive tool strategically used by athletes for learn-
ing and optimizing their specific movement tasks. Dancers, for
example, use motor imagery to exercise the memorization of long
sequences and to improve movement quality in terms of spa-
tiotemporal adaptation and artistic expression. Whereas mental
practice or mental training encompass further techniques such as
self-talk, goal setting or attention focusing, we refer by “motor
imagery training” to the act of repeatedly imagining a movement
without executing the movement and with the primary intent of
acquiring and optimizing motor skills (for an overview see Morris
et al., 2005).
Various theories have been used to explain the effects of motor
imagery training (or mental practice, e.g., Heuer, 1985; Driskell
et al., 1994). The major scientific models largely differentiate
physiologically peripheral (neuromuscular) effects and central
effects (e.g., symbolic codes or programs). It has been suggested
that motor imagery is based on simulation processes that recruit
motor representations, and that imagery, observation and execu-
tion of movements share a major part of their neural correlates
(so-called functional equivalence, Jeannerod, 1995, 2001; Kosslyn
et al., 2001). Furthermore, it has been shown that motor imagery
involves internal motor attention processes and states of high
concentration (Munzert et al., 2008).
Importantly, the perceptual-cognitive hypothesis opens up a
new explanation for the effects of motor imagery training. This
hypothesis is derived from the theory of ideomotor action (Knuf
et al., 2001; Koch et al., 2004) and is in line with current neuro-
physiological findings (Jeannerod, 1995, 2004). The perceptual-
cognitive hypothesis posits a representational system in which
strong cognitive representation units (nodes) are linked to per-
ceptual representations (e.g., kinesthetic, optical, or acoustic
effect codes). Because they possess a spatiotemporal structure,
these representations can be related directly to movements. This
makes additional motor, spatial-pictorial, or symbolic represen-
tations unnecessary for movement control (see Heuer, 1985).
Another basic assumption of the perceptual-cognitive model is
that imagining a movement and performing it are based on the
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same representations (Jeannerod, 1995, 2004), which can explain
the effectiveness of motor imagery training. Mental simulations of
movement may strengthen links between cognitive representation
of intermediate states of that movement and the accompanying
perceptual effect codes. At the same time, interfering perceptual
inputs will be inhibited.
This makes the SDA-M method proposed here directly rele-
vant for developing new forms of motor imagery training (cf. also
Cooley et al., 2013). One central question in sport psychology has
been the question of how to best tailor and deliver motor imagery
training such that it is most effective in enhancing an athlete’s
performance and in promoting learning. The main disadvantage
of traditional procedures is that they try to optimize performance
without taking the athlete’s mental technique representation into
account (i.e., they are representation-blind). If the movement’s
cognitive representation has structural gaps or errors, these will
tend to be stabilized rather than overcome by repeated practice.
An alternative method here is to measure the mental representa-
tion of the movement before motor imagery training and then
integrate these results into the training. Thus, similarly to the
finding that imagery tailored to the individual is more promis-
ing compared to standardized procedures (for an overview, see
Schuster et al., 2011), we suggest that the individual’s prerequisites
should be considered when applying motor imagery training.
As opposed to more subjective measures such as interview tech-
niques, the SDA-M method is an objective measure of BACs and
their relations (i.e., mental representation structure). As such, the
SDA-M serves to tailor imagery content of subsequent mental
practice according the individual’s cognitive status. This Motor
imagery Training based on Mental Representations (MTMR2) has
now been applied successfully for several years in professional
sports such as golf, volleyball (Schack, 2004b), gymnastics (Schack
and Heinen, 2000; Heinen et al., 2002), and windsurfing (Schack
and Hackfort, 2007).
To illustrate our approach, consider our recent research in
professional volleyball which addressed the spike (i.e., attack
hit). This movement requires at least 12 sub-steps (BACs). In
preparation for a motor imagery training program, we studied
this structure in the members of a Women’s Volleyball Youth
National Team. Figure 3 illustrates the results for two players who
are both outside hitters.
Player A (Figure 3A) was highly skilled in performing the
spike movement such that she was able to optimally execute the
technique. Accordingly, she held a clearly structured, almost ideal
movement representation in her movement memory. BAC 1–3 in
connection with 4 and 5 form the run-up phase. Concepts 6, 7,
and 8 combine for the hit-preparation phase, whereas 9, 10, and
11 make up the hit-phase.
In contrast, player B (Figure 3B) had difficulties in optimally
executing the spike for several years. The SDA-M analysis showed
a problematic structure in the mental movement representation:
BAC 1–3 and 4–5, which are important for the sequence of
2Although we focus in this paper on motor imagery rehearsal, the MTMR
approach is not restricted to this technique. In the MTMR approach other
techniques such as relaxation, cognitive or emotional preparation can be
included.
impulses during run-up and take-off, point to a less precise
memory structure. For this player, run-up and take-off were
broken down into two inefficient memory sections (5–2 and
4–3, encircled in Figure 3B). Subsequently, an individualized
motor imagery training program for player B tackled the memory
structure and developed motor imagery for an ideal take-off and a
proper spike. Additionally, player B went through a series of run-
up and take-off drills designed to bring out the optimal motion
sequence. The focus was on making the player aware of the altered
movement so that she could develop a new feeling for it. We
subsequently aimed to generate this optimal perception of the
movement also in the complementary motor imagery training.
This succeeded in improving player B’s spike significantly, and she
is now a member of the Women’s A-National Team. The advan-
tage of this combination of motor imagery training and memory
analysis is that athletes’ memory structures are integrated into the
motor imagery training considering their individual dispositions.
Holmes and Collins (2001) made an important step towards
individualized motor imagery training. These authors proposed
the so-called PETTLEP approach (Physical, Environment, Task,
Timing, Learning, Emotion and Perspective) to motor imagery
which stresses the need for functionally equivalent and therefore
behaviorally matched imagery interventions as opposed to tra-
ditional imagery interventions (e.g., Holmes and Collins, 2001;
Smith et al., 2007; Wakefield et al., 2013). That is, the seven
PETTLEP aspects of a given movement should be optimized
in the sense that they converge between actual and imagined
movement execution. This approach is partly rooted in Lang’s
bio-informational theory (Lang, 1979, 1985) which states that
motor imagery training affects motor performance by way of
the strengthening of memory representations. Specifically, during
imagery, stimulus, response, and meaning propositions3 are being
accessed and thus strengthen the representation of the movement
stored in memory, which in turn affects motor performance.
Based on findings from neurophysiological research that similar
processes are activated during imagined and actual motor actions,
Holmes and Collins (2001) suggested that functional equiva-
lence is a major prerequisite for the efficacy of mental practice.
Therefore, behavioral matching of the imagined experience to
the actual physical experience has been suggested to enhance the
efficiency of motor imagery training as it is proposed to best access
the underlying motor representation (Holmes and Collins, 2001;
Wakefield et al., 2013).
Whereas the PETTLEP approach draws on the matching of the
imagined and the actual experience in order to best access the
underlying motor representation during motor imagery training,
MTMR addresses the mental representation itself as the basis for
motor imagery training. That is, a particular movement and its
structure are emphasized in MTMR and corrected, if necessary.
In that sense, the imagined movement is individually adapted,
3According to Lang (1977, 1985), images are functionally organized sets of
propositions. Stimulus propositions reflect the content of the image, response
propositions the person’s responses to the image, and meaning propositions
the interpretations of the image, i.e., its meaning for the person. Response
proposition provide a access to the motor command system in order to
generate movements. Note that these proposition are conceptualized as having
an amodal format (Lang, 1977; Callow and Hardy, 2005).
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FIGURE 3 | Memory profile of the spike in player A’s (A) and player B’s (B)
movement memory. BACs: (1) taking arms back, (2) stamp step, (3) bending
knees and trunk, (4) swinging both arms forward, (5) extending legs, (6) body
arching, (7) spiking arm back, (8) high elbow, (9) glance toward opponent’s
block, (10) spike emphasizing the wrist, (11) whipping extension of arm, and
(12) drawthrough of hitting arm. A scale indicating the distances of BAC
representations in movement memory is located on the left side of the figure.
The lower the value of a horizontal connection between two BACs, the lower
the distance between them in movement memory (Printed from: Schack,
2004a, p. 417 with permission).
not only the embedding aspects such as the PETTLEP elements
should be optimized. Lang’s (1979, 1985) bio-informational the-
ory points to a potential mechanism of how MTMR (employing
the SDA-M method) may lead to performance improvements.
By emphasizing specific movement phases during motor imagery
training, access or retrieval of response and meaning proposition
might be facilitated and, thereby, help to improve the structure
of the movement representation. It is important to note that the
SDA-M method if used in motor imagery training is focused on
imagining the movement in its biomechanically and functionally
optimal structure.
Motor imagery training is sometimes employed using the
SDA-M method by various professional and amateur sports ath-
letes and also in rehabilitation (Braun et al., 2006, 2007; Holmes,
2007; Malouin and Richards, 2013; Malouin et al., 2013 for
review) although imagery might be more efficient for stroke
patients in chronic stages (Ietswaart et al., 2011). In cases of
injury, motor imagery training offers a means of training even
when active movement execution is severely impaired. As a result,
new opportunities for motor imagery training open up in the
fields of medical and orthopedic-traumatologic rehabilitation.
Motor imagery training seems to be of great use for regaining
lost movement patterns after joint operations (Braun et al., 2006;
Holmes, 2007; Malouin et al., 2013). This provides more evidence
that motor imagery training provides a general means to link
imagery and movement in various areas of life.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MOTOR IMAGERY TRAINING
STUDIES
Velentzas (2010) recently explored the effects of MTMR on
volleyball spike performance, and on participants’ mental
representations of movements. Specifically, the effects of MTMR
and generic imagery scripts were investigated. Expert female
volleyball players who play the outside hitter position partic-
ipated. Selected movement characteristics were measured, and
mental representations for these movements were evaluated
using the SDA-M method. Participants’ spike accuracy was also
evaluated. To control for participants’ imagery ability, the Move-
ment Imagery Questionnaire-Revised (MIQ-R; Hall and Martin,
1997) was used. Results showed an increased performance in
the post and retention test for participants in the individualized
imagery script group compared to the generic script group. This
result suggests that an individualized imagery script which is
based on participants’ mental representations is more effective
than a traditional, generic motor imagery.
Recently, we examined the influence of motor imagery training
on the development of mental representation structure in early
skill acquisition (Frank et al., 2014). Based on the previous
finding (Frank et al., 2013) that mental representation struc-
tures functionally adapt during physical practice (i.e., during
motor learning), we investigated whether mental practice adds
to this adaptation process. For this purpose, novices practiced
the golf putt either mentally, physically, or in a combination of
both over three days, while a control group did not practice at
all. Participants’ putting performance and mental representation
structures (SDA-M) were tested before and after the intervention
and after a retention interval of 72 h. Analyses revealed functional
adaptations in mental representation structure together with
improvements in putting performance for all groups. Moreover,
participants who practiced mentally, either solely or in combina-
tion with physical practice, revealed representation structures that
were more similar to that of experts than participants who did not
practice mentally. This was the case for both, the post-test and
the retention-test. These findings support the idea that mental
practice in the sense of motor imagery training is beneficial to the
cognitive adaptation process during motor learning.
An interesting issue to address in future studies is that of an
individual’s imagery ability and its relation to the underlying
mental representation of a particular motor action in memory.
Imagery ability pertains to an individual’s general capability to
generate and to control an image (for an overview on imagery
ability, see e.g., Morris et al., 2005; Cumming and Williams, 2012)
and has been found to moderate the influence of motor imagery
rehearsal on performance (e.g., Goss et al., 1986; Robin et al.,
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2007). In this respect, a valuable objective for future research
would be to explore the relationship between imagery ability, as
measured by the MIQ-R (Hall and Martin, 1997), the revised
version of the Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire
(VMIQ-2; Roberts et al., 2008), or the Sport Imagery Ability
Questionnaire (SIAQ; Williams and Cumming, 2011), and mental
representation, as measured by SDA-M in more detail. To explain,
although holding the same level of general imagery ability, two
individuals may differ on how elaborate their underlying repre-
sentation of a certain motor skill is (and vice versa). Furthermore,
it will be interesting to investigate whether and how MTMR affects
imagery ability. Although it is well-known that motor imagery
training in general can improve imagery ability (e.g., Rodgers
et al., 1991), research has yet to be carried out to investigate the
specific influence of MTMR on imagery ability.
POTENTIAL RELEVANCE FOR TECHNICAL FIELDS
An important reason for the new interest in a cognitive-perceptual
and architectural understanding of action is the impressive devel-
opment of cognitive robotics. More research efforts are needed to
understand how mental imagery and its mechanisms in human
cognition can be applied to enhance motor control. Computa-
tional models of various kinds provide starting points to transfer
the insights from the role of mental representations and motor
imagery training to technical systems to enhance technical motor
control in human machine interactions such as humanoid robots.
Such computational models are often biologically inspired, that
is, they are artificial neural nets (e.g., WALKNET, Cruse et al.,
1998; Cruse and Schilling, 2013; Schilling et al., 2013 or echo state
networks, Krause et al., 2010). Other cognitive-inspired compu-
tational modeling approaches of mental imagery are based on
eye-movement research (Farah, 1984; Essig et al., 2012; Sima and
Freksa, 2012). Such modeling approaches can reveal engineering
principles for the development of autonomous systems that are
capable of exploiting the characteristics of mental imagery to
interact more efficiently and smoothly with the environment.
Furthermore, computational models of motor control can pro-
vide novel frameworks for the question of how the central ner-
vous system conjoins sensory signals, mental imagery and motor
commands.
CONCLUSIONS
Many theories assume that human action representations func-
tionally integrate motor information and information on action
effects. Specifically, perceptual-cognitive approaches claim that
motor control comprises representations of target objects, move-
ment characteristics, goals and anticipated disturbances. Here,
we have presented a method to objectively evaluate the structure
among basic action concepts, the fundamental building blocks
of movement representations at the mental level. Reported evi-
dence shows that the structure of movement representations as
assessed with the SDA-M is associated with individual skill levels,
biomechanical and task constraints and changes through (mental)
training. Thus, it is suggested that learning progress can also be
monitored by means of the SDA-M method which is an objective
way to measure cognitive (movement) representations.
We have reviewed a number of studies that demonstrate the
successful application of the SDA-M in professional sports such
as golf, dance and volleyball and also in other settings such as
rehabilitation after impairments. As the SDA-M permits a reliable,
individual diagnostics of movement representations, it provides
a valuable tool for individualized motor imagery training and
coaching.
The methods presented here make it possible to take the essen-
tial information on the underlying cognitive-perceptual action
system into account and, thereby, address the individual needs
of an athlete in a better way, for example, by using the described
Motor imagery Training based on Mental Representation method
(MTMR). The theoretical perspective on the construction of
action developed here (cf. Schack, 2004a,b), and the SDA-M
method could be relevant for optimizing the daily work of the
sport psychologist and also for opening up new perspectives to
modify approaches to motor imagery training (Schack and Bar-
Eli, 2007; Schack and Hackfort, 2007).
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